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 Collegiate Athletic Directors as Entrepreneurs 
 
 
 
Michael A. Leeds
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Temple University
*
 
 
 
 
 One can define entrepreneurship, at its most basic level, as rent-seeking behavior.  This 
behavior can be productive, as when firms innovate to create new or better products or when they 
enter a market to increase output where price exceeds marginal cost.  Rent-seeking can also be 
unproductive, particularly when it interfaces with the public sector.  In such cases, firms may try 
to create or preserve rents by securing monopoly power from the government.   
 Traditionally, economists have analyzed rent-seeking behavior solely in the private and 
government sectors of the economy.  I extend the concept to the not-for-profit sector, in 
particular to the sphere of higher education.  Specifically, I construct a simple model of rent-
seeking behavior by colleges and universities, as seen by their decisions to fund some sports and 
not fund others.  While I associate the funding decision with the collegiate athletic directors, one 
can just as easily attribute the decisions I describe to the president or board of trustees of the 
university.  The findings show why football and, to a lesser extent, men‟s basketball tend to 
dominate intercollegiate athletics.  They also demonstrate why schools sometimes differ in the 
sports they offer and why Title IX poses such a dilemma for college athletics.  Finally, they show 
that appealing to “government” – in the form of the National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) – may result in productive rent-seeking behavior rather than unproductive behavior. 
 In the next section, I introduce the notion of the athletic director as entrepreneur.  In 
Section II, I present the basic model of how athletic directors behave.  In Section III, I extend the 
model to show how the NCAA and Title IX affect the basic model.  A conclusion follows. 
 
I. The Athletic Director as Entrepreneur 
 Just as the public choice literature has replaced our vision of selfless pubic servants with 
a more cynical view of vote-maximizing politicians and budget-maximizing bureaucrats, theories 
of how institutions of higher education operate have also changed our view of educational 
administrators.  Current theories generally start from the assumption that colleges and 
universities act to maximize their “prestige” with potential applicants, alumni, and - in the case 
of public universities - with state legislators. (See, for example, James (1986).)  Colleges can 
compete with one another for the attention of these different groups in several ways.  They may 
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bid against one another to attract past or future Nobel Laureates to teach literature, physics, or 
economics courses, as when Princeton hired Toni Morrison or when Stanford lured Milton 
Friedman away from Chicago.  Alternatively, they may try to hire former high-profile public 
officials to teach courses in government, international relations, or public policy, as when 
Harvard hired Mikhail Gorbachev or when Princeton hired Paul Volcker.  To the extent that 
these activities increase the number of students educated or the quality of the education they 
receive, we can say that they result in a net gain to society.  If, however, schools simply bid up 
salaries in order to lure faculty away from one another, pure rents result and there is no 
improvement in the quantity or quality of education provided. 
 While such hiring decisions and expenditures on research and graduate programs may 
make a splash among literary, scientific, or intellectual circles, they make little impression on the 
public at large.  Since at least the dawn of the 20th century, colleges have recognized that 
football and, more recently, basketball can catch the public‟s eye in a way that more intellectual 
pursuits cannot.  Some college presidents, such as the University of Southern California‟s Rufus 
von Kleinsmid and Michigan State‟s John Hannah explicitly embraced athletics as a way to build 
their universities (See Shapiro (1983), Lawrence (1987), Thelin (1994), Byers (1995), Sperber 
(1998)).  The president of the University of Oklahoma may have most candidly expressed this 
attitude in the 1950s when he appealed to the state legislature for additional funds so that he 
could “build a university of which our football team can be proud.”  (Thelin (1994), p. 115)   
 Studies have since examined the role that successful athletics programs play in attracting 
students (McCormick and Tinsley (1987) or Murphy and Trandel (1994)) and in attracting 
donations from alumni (McCormick and Tinsley (1990), Grimes and Chressanthis (1994), and 
Baade and Sundberg (1996)).  (Borland, (1992) et al. look at both aspects of a successful 
program.)  Fleisher, et al. (1992) assert that the surpluses generated by sports like football and 
basketball subsidize sports that fail to cover their expenses.  Conversely, when a football 
program fails to run the expected surplus - as has recently happened at the University of 
Minnesota - other sports feel the financial strain (Craig, et al. (2001).  Rishe (1999) and Agthe 
and Billings (2000) provided empirical support for these claims.  Using data from Naughton 
(1997), Rishe showed that profits from football underwrite unprofitable men‟s and women‟s 
sports.  Leeds, Suris, and Durkin (2002), though, find that the cross subsidization is rather small. 
 Earlier studies share a common weakness in that they are essentially institutional or 
empirical in nature and provide no model for the behavior of the officials who determine the 
athletic policy of the institution.  Their behavioral insights are therefore limited.   
 In this paper, I construct a model of a “prestige-maximizing” athletic director who seeks 
the appropriate mix of sports and expenditures.  While the decision to invest in athletics is a 
complex one, involving a college‟s board of trustees, central administration, faculty, and alumni, 
I shall concentrate on the role played by the athletic director.  While an oversimplification, it still 
captures the essence of the decision process.  Moreover, since athletic directors oversee the 
college‟s intercollegiate athletic programs, they play a major role in setting and implementing the 
athletic priorities of the college. 
 I develop a simple model with which I show that athletic directors willingly fund sports 
other than football only if the sports generate sufficient prestige or a surplus of revenue, which 
can then be used to fund other, prestige-generating sports.  Since most sports do not generate a 
surplus, athletic directors naturally seek to direct most of the funds at their disposal to football.  
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The model thus also explains why athletic directors seek to minimize expenditure on women‟s 
sports, as few women‟s sports generate much publicity and almost none generate revenue.   
 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 I assume that an athletic department‟s contribution to the prestige of a university is a 
function of the quality of the sports it offers, as measured by wins and losses, and of the size of 
each team‟s “market.”  A team‟s market is the number of teams in its competitive group.  This 
can take on several different meanings.  A Division III lacrosse program at a college like 
Haverford may consider only local rivals like Swarthmore as members of its market.  In contrast, 
a Division I-A college football program like Michigan or Notre Dame would regard all other 
major football programs in the nation as members of its market.  For now, I assume that each 
athletic program can offer at most two sports: a generic sport, g; and football, f.  As in Leeds, 
Suris and Durkin (2002), I assume that the athletic director funds these two sports so as to 
maximize a prestige function that is twice continuously differentiable and additively separable in 
each sport.  I assume that the quality of the team and its market size both increase prestige, and 
that the cross partial of quality and market size is positive.  The last condition says that being a 
big fish in a big pond brings more prestige than being a big fish in a small pond (i.e., winning the 
Rose Bowl confers more prestige on Michigan than beating Swarthmore brings to Haverford).   
 While success on the playing field adds to a school‟s prestige, I assume that the marginal 
impact falls as the school becomes more successful.  I thus ignore the discontinuities associated 
with “championship effects.”  Equation (1) summarizes these principles. 
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where i  is the prestige accruing to institution i and Qj is the quality of sport j, as measured in 
number of wins (j=f,g).  Additive separability by sport is equivalent to assuming that the prestige 
generated by a school‟s football team does not affect the prestige generated by its other sports 
and vice versa, which I do purely for simplicity‟s sake.   
 Fleisher et al. (1992) suggest that athletic directors try to spend any surplus generated by 
their more popular sports in order to keep the revenue within the Athletic Department.  This 
claim is a modified version of the “budget maximization” objective of a bureaucracy first 
proposed by Niskanen (1968).  I employ this observation by assuming that athletic departments 
face a zero profit constraint.  (One could capture unprofitable Athletic Departments without 
altering the basic results by adding a fixed subsidy to the model.)  Specifically, athletic 
departments maximize prestige subject to:  
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where Rij(Qj,nj) is the revenue generated by sport j at institution i and C
i
j(Qj,nj) is the price per 
quality unit of sport j to institution i. Again, I assume that the revenue generated by increasing the 
quality of a sports program rises with the size of the market in which the team participates 
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.  Quirk and Fort (1994) show that a professional team‟s revenue increases with its 
performance.  I assume that a similar relationship holds at the collegiate level, as several studies 
have shown that successful athletic programs increase alumni donations to those programs (See 
Seligman and Bookheimer (1983), Coughlin and Erekson (1984), and McCormick and Tinsley 
(1990)), and anecdotal evidence suggests that gate revenue also fluctuates with performance.  As 
with prestige, I assume that the marginal impact of quality on net revenue decreases, so 
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 Maximizing prestige subject to constraint (for simplicity I drop the school index, i) yields 
the familiar first order condition: 
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for a given size of the market (nj=nk).  Intuitively, equation (3) says that the athletic director sets 
the ratio of marginal prestige from any two sports equal to the ratio of net marginal costs (the 
difference between the marginal cost of quality and the marginal revenue of quality).  It follows 
that a school will invest more in the quality of sport j if equation (3) is upset by a rise in the 
marginal impact of quality in sport j on prestige, a rise in marginal revenue for sport j, or a fall 
marginal cost for sport j, ceteris paribus.    
 The impact of market size complicates this story, as it makes intercollegiate sports 
resemble a club good, as defined by Buchanan (1965).  Figure 1 shows a simple example of how 
a college can field a given team in a market of varying size.  The picture hearkens back to 
Buchanan‟s basic model, except that the shapes of the benefit and cost curves reflect the 
conditions set out above rather than Buchanan‟s conditions.  Specifically, Figure 1 shows the 
benefits (in terms of prestige) and net costs of fielding a team of given quality.  The figure shows 
that the school will not wish to field a team if the size of the market is too small, in which case 
the benefits of investing in the team are too small.  Similarly, if the market becomes too large, the 
costs will rise to such an extent that, again, it does not pay to field a team.  The optimal market 
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size is the point at which the two curves are as far apart as possible. Figures 2 and 3 show how 
two sports might differ.  Figure 2 shows that, if sport j has greater marginal prestige than sport k, 
then the optimal size of the market for a given quality, n*, will also be greater.  Figure 3 shows 
that, if sport j brings greater prestige but does not have greater marginal prestige, then the optimal 
size of the market will not differ, but the athletic director will be willing to support the existence 
of the sport at a smaller market size. 
 This basic insight, when combined with the first order conditions, shows that the success 
that football has enjoyed creates a self-perpetuating dominance in athletic budgets.  It also shows 
the danger facing the many sports that do not bring in sizable revenue or generate much prestige.  
Because football generates so much more prestige, it is more profitable at any market size.  Thus, 
at nf=ng=0 and Qf=Qg=0, an athletic director would prefer to fund football over the generic sport.  
Moreover, NCAA data show that other sports seldom generate a profit (see Fulks (1998)).  
Rational athletic directors will therefore make football the foundation of their athletic program, 
investing in the quality of their football team until the marginal prestige falls and the net 
marginal cost rises enough for the school to want to spend an additional dollar on another sport.  
The athletic department will then invest in additional sports until the profits generated by football 
are dissipated.  The profits and prestige generated by football, however, may be very slow to 
dissipate.  Since other directors also feel this way, more schools field football teams than field 
other sports.  As football has grown in significance from claiming local or statewide bragging 
rights to attracting a nation-wide audience, the added size of the market further has further 
enhanced the value of the sport, thereby increasing the funding that flows to it.   
 At some schools, however, athletic directors find it optimal to promote sports in addition 
to – or instead of – football.  If, for example, the marginal cost of quality for sport g is much 
lower than the marginal cost of quality for football (not a rare occurrence given the equipment 
and insurance requirements of football), the net marginal cost of football may be so much greater 
than the net marginal cost of the generic sport that the optimal size of investment in the football 
program may be small relative to investment in the other sport.  Thus, urban schools like 
Georgetown in Washington, DC or St. John‟s in New York have developed “big-time” 
reputations in basketball but have distinctly minor football programs because they find it so 
much cheaper to invest in basketball and do not see offsetting prestige gains from football. 
 Another reason for funding other sports stems from differences in the marginal prestige 
functions.  If a less profitable sport generates enough prestige, such as if it produces Olympic 
athletes, a college may choose to fund it despite its unprofitability.  Similarly, if the sport 
generates enough net revenue, it may receive funding even it has only local or regional appeal.  
Hockey programs in the Northeast and upper Midwest may fit the latter description. 
 Finally, differences in fundraising abilities may explain regional or institutional 
differences in behavior.  For example, the audience for state schools includes state legislators, 
who control funding for the university.  The impact of a winning football program is likely to be 
greatest among state schools (See, for example, Thelin (1994)).  The added pressure helps 
explain why 21 of the Top 25 ranked football programs in final ESPN rankings for the 2001 
season were state schools.  (The exceptions were Miami, Syracuse, Stanford, and Boston 
College.) 
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III. Extensions of the Basic Model: The NCAA and Title IX 
 The model cited above suggests that many athletic directors would choose to spend their 
entire budget on football.  However, no school does this.  Instead, big-time football programs 
seem to be associated with a wide variety of “non-revenue” sports.  In this section, I consider the 
institutional impact of the NCAA on the behavior of athletic directors.  I also provide a new 
insight into why Title IX has had such a negative impact on men‟s sports. 
 The reasoning in Section II suggests that many sports fail to generate either the prestige or 
the revenue needed to justify their existence.  They exist solely by mandate from the NCAA.  For 
example, the NCAA Board of Directors recently approved new criteria for all schools that wish 
to field a Division I-A football team.  These regulations include fielding at least 16 varsity sports 
(with at least six for men and at least eight for women), providing at least one sport in every 
“season” (fall, winter, and spring), and providing at least 115 scholarships (or spending a 
minimum dollar amount) on scholarships in sports other than football.   
 Unlike government regulations the NCAA‟s restrictions on rent-seeking athletic directors 
force them to behave more entrepreneurially.  The restrictions cited above compel athletic 
directors to enter more markets – to provide a greater variety of sports – than they would freely 
choose to provide.  By reasoning outlined in Section II, increasing the size of the less profitable 
sports‟ markets causes the prestige and marginal prestige from additional investment in them to 
rise.  Figures 2 and 3 show that greater (marginal) prestige, in turn, increases the desirability of 
further investment in the generic sport.  Thus, by effectively requiring that enough schools have, 
say, hockey programs, the NCAA “primes the pump” and encourages voluntary investment in 
hockey. 
 Perhaps nowhere is the lack of desire to enter new markets more evident than in the 
continuing failure of collegiate athletic directors to fund women‟s sports.  As a result, women‟s 
athletics were almost completely ignored until the federal government stepped in with Title IX of 
the 1972 Education Amendments to the 1964 Civil Rights Act.    
 Prior to Title IX, only 30,000 women – about 1.7 percent of female undergraduates – 
participated in intercollegiate sports.  By 1997-98, that figure had grown to about 157,000 
(General Accounting Office (2000)).  Still, women lag far behind men in both their athletic 
opportunities – while women are now a majority of undergraduates, only a little over a third of 
all college athletes are women – and the funding of their athletic programs (Dillon (1997)).   
 At the same time that advocates of Title IX decry the slow progress of gender equity on 
college campuses, others complain that whatever advances have been made have come at the 
expense of “non-revenue” men‟s sports.  In fact, many colleges claim that they can equalize 
opportunities for women and men only by reducing opportunities for men.  Several colleges have 
eliminated highly successful men‟s programs - such as swimming and gymnastics at UCLA - 
while some sports, such as men‟s gymnastics and wrestling, are in danger of disappearing from 
college campuses altogether.  (Lynch, 2001) 
 The model developed in Section II shows why athletic directors have not willingly funded 
women‟s sports.  First, women‟s sports are a net drain on finances.  According to data collected 
by The Chronicle of Higher Education under the Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act, (which 
underlie much of the General Accounting Office report), 290 of the 303 Division I women‟s 
programs operated at a deficit in 1995-96.  Casual observation of women‟s sports coverage in the 
media and attendance at women‟s sports events also suggests that colleges attach little prestige to 
women‟s athletics.  While it was hoped that Title IX would generate enough interest to encourage 
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additional investment, the low returns seem to have kept women‟s sports at a corner solution, the 
minimal amount of funding to prevent legal action by athletes or punishment by the NCAA.   
 Title IX has complicated the funding decisions of athletic directors.  Assuming, for 
simplicity that the athletic director works at a school at which the number of undergraduate 
women equals the number of undergraduate men, Title IX would require equal funding of men‟s 
and women‟s sports.  I assume that the athletic director funds women‟s sports according to the 
rule 
 
    )( gf CC   ,       (4) 
 
where   is the amount of money spent on women‟s sports and  is the fraction of the mandated 
amount of Title IX funding that the school provides. (If the athletic director obeyed Title IX  
would equal 1.)  The cost of sport j thus becomes )1(* jC .  The increase in the cost of non-
revenue sports could cause some athletic directors to shut them down.  The decline in the size of 
the market for these sports then sets off a chain of events, as the prestige and marginal prestige 
decline with the reduction in market size.  As a result, some athletic directors may shut down 
some men‟s sports even if they do not directly cause the college to run afoul of Title IX. 
 
IV. Conclusions 
 Just as a profit-maximizing entrepreneur will utilize inputs efficiently to maximize 
profits, a prestige-maximizing athletic director will allocate resources so as to generate publicity 
as efficiently as possible.  Typically, this will come by devoting resources to a few sports like 
football or men‟s basketball.  A few schools will find it optimal to support other sports, like 
hockey or wrestling.  The NCAA ensures the existence of a core of other sports by requiring that 
schools provide a minimum number of sports if they wish to have a “big-time” football program.   
 Similarly, unless constraints are placed on an entrepreneurial athletic director, women‟s 
sports have little hope of survival.  In most cases, they generate neither the prestige nor the 
revenue of other sports.  As a result, prestige-maximizing athletic directors will try to deny them 
any funds at all.   Title IX prevents athletic directors from following this strategy.  Rational 
athletic directors respond, however, by eliminating those men‟s sports that generate the least 
prestige or revenue.  The gains of Title IX have thus come at a significant price.       
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Figure 1 
Optimal Market Size for a Sport 
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It does not pay for a college to field a team in a market smaller than n1 or larger than n2.  The optimal size 
will be n*, where n1<n*<n2 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Differences in Marginal Prestige Leads to Differences in Optimal Size of Market 
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If the marginal prestige of sport 2 is greater than that of sport 1, then the optimal size of the market for sport 2 will 
be greater. 
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Figure 3 
Directors Fund More Prestigious Sports at Smaller Market Sizes 
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 n2       n1 
 If the benefits, but not the marginal benefits, of sport 2 are greater than for sport 2 than for sport 1, 
then the athletic director will find it optimal to fund sport 2 at a smaller market size than for sport 1. 
 
 
 
 
